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Abstract. We investigate the welfare effects of proportional income taxa-
tion in a standard general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI).
Formally, our analysis is on the allocative effects of state-contingent income
tax reforms. Tax reforms are restricted to be anonymous, publicly and truth-
fully announced before markets open, and they are required to result in
an ex-post constrained efficient allocation. Our main result is to show that
there do typically exist contingent tax reforms that are Pareto improving.
These reforms, acting directly on the asset span, modify private risk-sharing
opportunities. Thus, unlike most of the GEI literature, the type of policy
transmission mechanism considered does not rely on second-order, relative
spot price effects.Yet, the key welfare effects of our tax reforms are substan-
tially equivalent to those induced through changes in relative spot prices, as,
for example, in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), Geanakoplos et al.
(1990), or in Citanna et al. (2001).
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1. Introduction
The use of state-contingent taxation has always been hotly debated. Besides
counter-cyclical active fiscal policies of Keynesian tradition, policy mak-
ers have been concerned with the problem of designing and implementing
passive, state-contingent tax rules. In this paper we investigate the welfare
effects of linear income taxation in economies in which consumers cannot
fully efficiently diversify economic risk. In a standard, two periods, general
equilibrium model, with incomplete markets (GEI), we explore the effects
of state-contingent income tax reforms on individual risk sharing. Our main
result is to show that there do, typically, exist tax reforms that result in Pareto
superior equilibria (see Theorem 1). Moreover, we show that this is true both
in a pure exchange GEI, and in a production GEI with stock markets. Fi-
nally, we also argue that tax reforms may have welfare effects of the opposite
sign (i.e., tax reforms may effectively change individual utility levels in any
direction; see Corollary 1); this latter feature comes as a warning to policy
makers who are called upon to design this type of reform.
Formally, our welfare analysis follows the general prescriptions of the
public finance literature on (gradual) policy reforms (see, for example, Gues-
nerie (1977), and Feldstein (1976)). Given an initial economy, we ask if there
exists a feasible direction of tax changes such that the initial equilibrium al-
location can be locally Pareto improved. We then prove that such tax reforms
are robust, by showing that their effects hold generically, that is, for an open
and dense subset of economies parameterized by endowments, preferences,
and production technologies.
The class of tax reforms we analyze has the following features:
• reforms take the underlying market structure as given;
• they are ex-post constrained Pareto optima;
• they are anonymous;
• they are restricted to achieve state-by-state budget balance.
A local marginal change of the tax system acts directly on the asset span,
changing (but not augmenting) consumers’ ability to redistribute income
across contingencies; precisely, tax reforms do not change the degree of
market incompleteness. Re-allocations are completely decentralized: after
a tax reform a new equilibrium allocation is achieved competitively, through
individual trade on the existent markets. We then say that our tax reforms
are (not only ex-ante but also) ex-post constrained Pareto optima. Moreover,
the type of taxation considered is anonymous. Finally, state-by-state bud-
get balance inhibits the planner to implementing across states- (and time-)
income redistributions directly.
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The original aspect of our result is the effectiveness of contingent tax re-
forms in modifying consumers’risk-sharing opportunities, through a change
in the asset span position. The highly simplified representation of our econ-
omy and of the central government, aims precisely to isolate this effect, and,
ultimately, to derive a minimal set of conditions under which this type of tax-
ation leads to well identified welfare effects. Thus, for example, we assume
that a single perishable commodity is traded in the economy. In contrast
with most of the GEI literature, our results are not driven by changes in rela-
tive spot prices (see, for example, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986),
Geanakoplos et al. (1990), Citanna et al. (1998, 2001)). Asset span varia-
tions are powerful enough to generate changes in individual utilities that
are otherwise typical of spot price, second-order effects (see Section 3.2,
Remark 2).
The transmission mechanism of tax reform is also different from the one
characterizing financial innovation in the sense of Cass and Citanna (1998)
and of Elul (1995, 1999). Precisely, in contrast with Elul (1999), we assume
that the number of assets (or asset markets) is given, and cannot be modified
by the central government. Thus, although tax reforms may tilt the asset
span, they do not change its dimension.
Our representation of the central government is also highly simplified.
A fictitious central planner set ad valorem, anonymous, state-contingent
taxes (and/or subsidies) on individuals’ incomes, subject to a state-by-state
fiscal budget constraint. Less restrictive budgetary rules and/or other typical
motives for public intervention, if introduced, would only strengthen our
results. Similarly, we could, and indeed we do, discuss the case in which
income may be taxed at different rates, depending on its source (endowment
income, returns from different assets, etc.). A necessary condition for our
results to hold is that the number of policy objectives does not exceed the
number of tax instruments: the changes of the utility levels corresponding to
the H consumer types must be less than the tax instruments. This condition
is an incomplete market analogue of that due to Tinbergen (1952).
The approach used to prove our results is comparative statics, and relies
on well-known techniques of differential topology. In particular, the welfare
analysis follows the guidelines traced in Smale (1974), later applied and
extended by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and, more recently, by
Citanna et al. (1998), whose underlying approach is used in this paper.
Some concluding observations may help the reader. First, our contin-
gent taxes are not progressive in income. They are linear income taxes, such
as those typically used to tax individual income from bond holdings. The
assumption that tax reforms may be state-contingent is realistic inasmuch
as it is the decision of implementing a tax scheme contingently on factors
exogenous to the underlined model of the economy, factors which may be
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accounted for in the definition of the state space (e.g., aggregate supply
shocks, financial crises, etc.). Secondly, our model does not endogenously
provide an explanation of why markets are incomplete. Extensions in this di-
rection, although potentially interesting, are beyond the scope of this paper.
Moreover, at this stage, our positive analysis of tax reform does not provide
any specific recipe for policy intervention. Yet, our results do indicate and
analyze interesting effects that income taxes may exhibit in incomplete mar-
ket economies. Finally, our analysis is local. We do not derive an optimal
fiscal policy rule: a mapping from the equilibrium set to the set of feasible
tax rates which a central government should optimally enforce. We instead
trace the direction of (robust) welfare-improving tax reforms.
Our work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the benchmark
economy, and give a notion of competitive equilibrium. In Section 3, we state
and discuss our main results (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1). There, we also
discuss and compare our notion of constrained optimality with the standard
ones used in the GEI literature; this is done by mean of a few examples, both
for a pure exchange and for a production economy. The proofs of our results
are in Section 4, which also includes other technical results such as the
(local) existence and regularity of equilibria (Theorem 2 and Corollary 2).
2. The model
2.1. The general framework
2.1.1. Private agents and commodities There are two dates indexed by 0
and 1. At date 1 there is a finite number S of possible states of the world,
s = 1, . . . , S, and S ={1, . . . , S}. We also use the convention of labeling
date 0 as s = 0. There is a single perishable good that can be used both for
consumption and investment at date 0, and for consumption at date 1. We
denote by N = S + 1 the number of contingent goods in the economy.
There are H ≥ 2 consumers, H = {1, . . . , h, . . . , H }. Every consumer
h is endowed with a vector (eh0 , eh1) ∈ RN++ of contingent goods, where
eh1 =
(
eh1 , . . . , e
h
S
)
denotes date 1 endowments. For simplicity, we assume
that each individual consumption set coincides with the nonnegative orthant
of the commodity space, RN+ , and we denote a typical element by (x0, x1).
The utility function uh : RN+ → R represents the preference ordering of con-
sumer h over his consumption set. Lastly, some rather strong, but standard,
assumptions on preferences and endowments are introduced.
Assumption 1. For every h in H:
(1) uh is twice continuously differentiable, and differentiably strictly in-
creasing (Duh(x)  0 ∀x ∈ RN++)1;
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(2) uh is differentiably strictly quasi-concave (rD2uh(x)rT < 0 ∀r ∈ RN ,
r = 0, such that Duh(x)rT = 0 ∀x ∈ RN++);
(3) indifference surfaces are contained in the interior of the positive orthant
(the closure of {x ∈ RN++ : uh(x) ≥ uh(x ′)
}
is contained in RN++ ∀x ′ ∈
R
N++);
(4) endowments are strictly positive (eh  0).
We denote by U the set of utility functions satisfying Assumption 1(1)
through 1(4).
There are J ≥ 1 assets, J = {1, . . . , j, . . . , J }. Assets may be charac-
terized either by fixed return (e.g., bonds) or by returns that depend on en-
dogenous variables (e.g., stocks or equities). Precisely, we let J = J1 ∪J2,
and J = J1 + J2, where J1 is the set of J1 assets with fixed return ma-
trix R ∈ RNJ1+ (say bonds), possibly empty, and J2 is the set of securities
whose return matrix is endogenous and depends on production activities
(say stocks). Pure exchange economies, with an empty set J2, will also be
considered in the paper.
Production is carried out by J2 competitive firms. The technology of a
typical firm j inJ2 is represented by its production possibility set Y j ⊂ RN ,
with typical input–output vector yj = (yj0 , yj1 ). Further, firms are endowed
with a vectorηj in RN++ of contingent goods. The properties of the production
technologies are summarized in the following.
Assumption 2. For every firm j in J2:
(1) Y j ⊂ RN is closed and convex, 0 ∈ Y j , Y j ∩ RN+ = {0} and RN− ⊂ Y j ;
(2) (∑h eh +
∑
j (Y
j + ηj ) ∩ RN+
)
is compact, and ∀h, eh ∈ RN++;
(3) let Mj ⊂ RN be a mj -dimensional subspace with 1 ≤ mj ≤ N ; then
Y j ⊂ Mj is an mj -dimensional manifold with boundary; its bound-
ary, ∂Y j , is twice continuously differentiable, and differentiably strictly
quasi-convex at each point;
(4) firms’ endowments are strictly positive (ηj  0).
Further, we assume that the technology set Y j can be represented by
Y j = {yj ∈ RN : f j (yj + ηj ) ≤ 0, ηj ∈ RN++}, where f j : RN → R is a
differentiable transformation function. We also assume that (−yj0 , yj1 ) > 0,
and denote the typical element of Y j by y = (yj0 , yj1 ).
Assumption 2 implies that f j (·) is twice continuously differentiable,
non-decreasing and strictly quasi-convex, and that it satisfies f j (ηj ) = 0.
We denote by Y the set of transformation functions satisfying Assump-
tion 2(1) through 2(3). Finally, for notational simplicity, in the rest of the
paper we simply write yj for yj +ηj . Firms’endowments ηj are only needed
1 Hereafter, we use the convention that >, when applied to vectors, denotes a weak in-
equality ( a strong inequality).
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to prove the existence of equilibria, and do not play any role in our welfare
analysis of tax reforms.
2.1.2. Government, income taxes, and fiscal budget rule We define a tax
policy by specifying a set of tax variables and a budgetary rule. Further,
as usual, we call instruments those policy variables that are independently
controlled by the central planner.
We consider a tax policy in which, at date 0, the planner announces a
system of ad valorem taxes (and/or subsidies, or allowances) on consumers’,
date 1, personal income. This system of taxes and allowances makes indi-
vidual taxation a non-linear function of income: different levels of state-
contingent personal income may be taxed/subsidized at different rates. As
we shall make clear as we go along, the type of taxation that produces in-
teresting welfare effects in our simplified setting is one that modifies the
state-contingent profile of the returns from portfolio holdings. For this rea-
son, hereafter, we shall focus on “capital income taxation”. State-contingent,
anonymous, lump-sum taxes/subsidies will only be introduced as a way of
achieving fiscal budget balance state-by-state: when capital income in state
s is taxed, its total revenue is redistributed lump-sum in the same state s.
The following alternative policy schemes, if introduced, would leave the
rest of the analysis and results substantially unchanged:
(a) a proportional, state-contingent, anonymous tax/subsidy system on in-
dividual total income (returns from portfolio holdings plus endowment
income);
(b) a proportional, state-contingent, asset (or sector) specific tax/subsidy
system on individual capital income.
In (b) we refer to the case in which bonds and equities can be taxed at
one or more different rates. Moreover, for bonds, (b) accounts for the case in
which interest payments are tax deductible, as well as for the case in which
they are not.
More formally, a portfolio θhj of a stock j ∈ J2 yields to h a before-tax
return θhj y
j
s in state s for all s in S. Similarly, a portfolio θhj of a bond j ∈ J1
yields to h, θhj R
j
s , in s for all s in S. Let T 1s be an open bounded subset of R
with typical element t1s = −1, with T 1 =
∏S
s=1 T
1
s ,
2 and denote the set of
feasible state-contingent taxes (subsidies) by T = RS × T 1. We formalize
the following general fiscal budget rule.
2 An alternative way of defining of the tax domain is to assume that T 1 is the interior of
a unit (S − 1)-sphere. This would still be without loss of generality, since our analysis is
entirely local, around the zero vector of policy instruments.
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Definition 1 (Fiscal budget balance). For every production plan y ∈ Y , and
portfolio θ ∈ RJH+ ,
∑
h∈H
(
t0s + t1s
(∑
j∈J1
θhj R
j
s +
∑
j∈J2
θhj y
j
s
))
= 0
for all (t0s , t1s
) = ts ∈ T1,s and all s ∈ S.
Our assumption defines the government budget constraint, imposing fis-
cal budget balance state-by-state. This implies that no centralized transfers
across time or states of the world are allowed. Moreover, in every state s,
one tax variable is not a policy instrument; precisely, if, in state s, t1s is
controlled by the central government, t0s is endogenously determined by
the fiscal budget constraint. The choice of policy instruments, between t0
and t1, is completely arbitrary, it may be different across states, and it does
not affect any of the latter results. Finally, two possible tax regimes can be
considered:
(i) one in which interest payments are tax-deductible at the rate t1;
(ii) a system in which interest earnings are taxed, but interest payments are
not tax deductible.
In the first system, say, a tax rate t1s < 0 is imposed on the return R
j
s θj from
holding a bond portfolio θj , in state s; then, the net interest paid to the bond
holders by the bond issuer is
(
1 + t1s
)
R
j
s θj (i.e., bond j interest payments
are tax deductible). This conforms to Definition 1. In a system of type (ii),
with no tax deductible interest payments, the fiscal budget constraint is
Ht0s + t1s
(∑
j∈J1 max
(
θhj , 0
)
R
j
s +∑j∈J2 yjs
)
= 0.
Let T ⊂ R2S be the set of taxes, with typical element t = (t0, t1).
Hereafter, to ease the exposition, we denote by t I the S-vector of policy
instruments, and by T I (⊂ T ) its domain.
2.1.3. Spot and security markets There are N (= (S + 1)) spot markets in
the economy. Since the only good produced is perishable, consumers’saving
can only take place through portfolio holdings (i.e., financial markets fully
specify the available saving technology).
Every consumer, h, holds an initial ownership share (or portfolio en-
dowment) θhj ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑
h θ
h
j = 1 for all firms j in J2. At date
0, when financial markets open, h can trade for a final portfolio vector θh.
Further, since in our simple economy ownership implies control, we assume
no-short sales, θhj ≥ 0. The market price of a stock j in J2 is qj . When h
purchases θhj stocks in firm j , she pays qjθhj and participates in the firm’s
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investment by a corresponding yj0 θhj , at date 0, and θhj entitles h to receive
y
j
s θ
h
j in state s (for all s in S), at date 1.
At time zero, consumers can also trade in bonds, which are assets in zero
net supply. The (after-tax) asset matrix is W = (W1,W2), where
W1 =
[
. . .
(
qj
(1 + t1s )Rjs
)
j∈J1
. . .
]
(N×J1)
,
W2 =
[
. . .
(
y
j
0 − qj
Mj(y1, t
1)
)
j∈J2
. . .
]
(N×J2)
andMj(y1, t1) has typical s-elementmjs = (1+t1s )yjs . Lastly, agents face the
same financial structure W . Thus, they all have equal access opportunities
to the equity market. Bankruptcy or default is not allowed.
2.1.4. The consumer problem For notational simplicity, let
e˜h =

eh0 +
∑
j∈J2
qjθ
h
j , e
h
1 + t01


define the total after-tax endowment of a typical consumer h. The individual
budget set, for given financial opportunities W and total endowments e˜h, is
B
(
W, e˜h
) =
{
xh ∈ RN+ :
θhj ≥ 0, j ∈ J2
xh − e˜h = Wθh
}
.
An individual optimum for h, at
(
W, e˜h
)
, is a pair
(
x̂h, θ̂ h
)
such that x̂h
maximizes uh(xh) on B
(
W, e˜h
)
, and θ̂ h satisfies x̂h − e˜h = Wθ̂h, and
θhj ≥ 0 for all j in J2.
At an interior individual optimum, x̂h  0, the present value vector (or
state price) of consumer h in state s is λ̂hs = λhs (̂xh) = Dxsu(̂xh)/Dx0u(̂xh).
Let 〈W 〉 denote the column span of W , a subspace of dimension (at most)
equal toJ . Its orthogonal complement, 〈W 〉⊥, has (at least) dimensionN−J .
If we assume, for the moment, that the no-short sale constraints are non-
binding, λ̂h ∈ 〈W 〉⊥.
2.1.5. The firm’s problem If we keep on abstracting from the no-short sale
constraints, the fact that, at the individual optimum, present value vectors
satisfy λh ∈ 〈W 〉⊥, implies that consumers do not typically agree on the
evaluation of future income profiles. Since consumers are also firms’ share-
holders, the latter poses problems for the definition of the objective function
of the firm. Precisely, if the firm chooses its production plans in the best
Income taxation when markets are incomplete 105
interest of shareholders, none of its feasible choices will, typically, achieve
shareholders’ unanimous approval. 3
Let βj ∈ RN++ be the evaluation criterion (or state price vector) given to
firm j ∈ J2. An individual optimum of firm j is a vector yj that maximizes
βjyj on Y j . Next, assume that firm j acts in the best interest of shareholders,
and let βj be a (linear) function of its shareholders’ present value vectors,
λh. In principle, we would (at least) like to require that, at equilibrium, βj
is consistent with the market value of the firm, qj , where by consistent we
mean that qj = (1/βj0
)
βjyj (see De Marzo (1988)). Consumers’ first-order
conditions imply that the firm problem is well defined if
(
1/βj0
)
βj belongs to
〈W 〉⊥ (i.e., to the same subspace to which consumers’ present value vectors
belong).4 Then, any consistent βj leads to a well defined firm’s problem.
Two consistent criteria, βj , have been extensively used in the literature.
One was proposed by Dre`ze, and the second by Grossman and Hart. In
Dre`ze (1987) each firm takes production decisions in the best interest of final
shareholders, by evaluating future profits with respect to βj = ∑h∈H θhj λh.
In Grossman and Hart (1979), firms act in the best interest of initial (or
date 0) shareholders, and βj = ∑h∈H θhj λh. The two criteria mainly differ
in the “timing” at which the evaluation of production projects is made. In
Grossman and Hart projects are chosen when asset markets are still open.
Thus shareholders may always “vote” against a production choice by selling
their shares in the firm. At equilibrium, the no-arbitrage condition ensures
that the market price they are paid matches their private evaluations. On
the contrary, Dre`ze’s criterion is based on the idea that production plans are
decided after the security markets close. Thus, current (or final) shareholders
rely entirely on the fact that production plans are decided in their interest.5
3 If financial markets are (generically) complete (dim〈W 〉 = J = S), consumers agree
on project evaluations: λh = λ ∈ 〈W 〉⊥ for all h, and dim〈W 〉⊥ = 1. Thus, if we assume
that firms act in the best interest of shareholders, it must be that, for given λ, a production
plan yj is chosen such that yj ∈ arg max {λyj : yj ∈ Y j } for all j . By introducing this
objective function, it is straightforward to show that the corresponding allocation is Pareto
optimal. This objective function is also appropriate in the case of partial spanning. Partial
spanning occurs when financial markets are incomplete, but firms are constrained to propose
projects, whose returns exclusively lie in the span of the marketed securities.
4 A further necessary condition, that is more related to the fact that individual demands
are well behaved, is that, in every state s, (at least) one consumer, h(s), has non-satiated
preferences. This ensures that, in equilibrium, λh(s)(x) > 0, and thus that all firms are
valued, preventing the security matrix from dropping rank.
5 Both criteria can be shown to be shareholder constrained efficient if lump-sum transfers
among shareholders are allowed. Grossman–Hart’s does also require that shareholders have
competitive price perceptions (i.e., shareholders of firm j correctly anticipate the effect of a
change of the production plan of j , on the market value of the firm). Magill and Shafer (1991),
p. 1586, discuss firms’ constrained efficient pricing criteria. For completeness, we say that a
decision yj of j is shareholder constrained efficient if there does not exist a marginal change
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It will be clearer as we go along in the paper that our main results hold for
any criterion, β, which is expressed as a functional of consumers’ present
value vectors, λ. For reasons of analytic tractability, we stick with the adop-
tion of a specific criterion, and choose the following modified Grossman–
Hart criterion.6
Definition 2 (Modified Grossman–Hart criterion). For every (θj , λ, t1j ) and
all s ∈ S ∪ {0}, βjs = ∑h θhj λhs
(
1 + t1s
)
is the pricing criterion of firm
j ∈ J2.
2.2. The equilibrium with taxes
Gathering the definitions of agents’ actions and markets we obtain a full
description of our economy, E(u, f, η, e, θ, R). We provide the following
definition of equilibrium at the policy instrument vector t I in T I .
Let ω = (η, e, θ, u, f ), and let E be the set of economies with typical
element (ω,R).
Definition 3 (E − t I equilibrium). In an economy (ω,R) in E , an equilib-
rium with tax instruments t I ∈ T I , and firm pricing criteria β, is a pair
((x, θ, y), (q, t)) such that:
(i) ∀h, (xh, θh) is an individual optimum for consumerh, at (q, y, ω, t, R);
(ii) ∀j , yj is an individual optimum for firm j , at βj ;
(iii) ∀j ∈ J1, ∑h θhj = 0; ∀j ∈ J2,
∑
h θ
h
j = 1;
(iv) t satisfies fiscal budget balance at t I .
Observe that, if (i)–(iv) are satisfied, spot markets clear. Moreover, (iv)
can be written differently depending on the type of fiscal policy assumed.
For the equilibrium to be well defined every βj must be chosen in the
set of consistent criteria (see Section 2.1.5). Finally, we define a no-tax
equilibrium, an E − t I equilibrium setting all tax instruments t I equal to
zero. Observe that our notion of no-tax equilibrium is the one-commodity
analogue of the equilibrium notion in Geanakoplos et al. (1990), when firms’
pricing criteria, β, are defined as in Dre`ze (1987); it is the one-commodity
dyj such that yj + dyj is optimal for j and (1,∇uh) · ∂xh
∂yj
dyj ≥ 0 for all shareholders h,
with strict inequality for some h. Further, we say that βj is shareholder constrained efficient
for j if, at equilibrium, it supports a decision profile yj that is shareholder constrained
efficient for j . Assume that lump-sum redistribution is possible at date zero. Then, βj is
shareholder constrained efficient if and only if
∑
h
(
1,∇uh) · (∂xh/∂yj )dyj ≤ 0 for every
dyj such that ∇f j · dyj = 0.
6 This criterion can be shown to be shareholder constrained efficient if: (1) lump-sum
transfers among shareholders are allowed, and (2) shareholders have competitive price per-
ceptions (see the previous footnote).
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analogue of the equilibrium notion in Grossman–Hart (1979), when β is
the Grossman–Hart criterion; it coincides with a standard notion of pure
exchange GEI equilibrium when J2 = ∅.
3. Welfare effects of tax reforms
3.1. Our main results
Definition 4 (Income Tax–Constrained Pareto Optimality, IT-CPO). In ev-
ery economy an E − t I equilibrium allocation of commodities fails to be
IT-CPO if there exists a t I ′ in T I such that the E− t I ′ equilibrium allocation
is Pareto superior.
For (u, f, R) fixed, let  denote the set of economies, whose typical
element  is denoted (e, η, θ). The set  =  × U × Y, with typical
element ω = (ψ, u, f ), is the set of economies, parametrized by ψ together
with the preferences and technologies. We are now ready to state our first
result.
Theorem 1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and 2 ≤ H ≤ S − J , J ≥ 1.
There exists a generic set of economies ∗∗ in the parameter space  such
that, for every ω in ∗∗, each no-tax, E − t I equilibrium is not an IT-CPO.
Observe that our theorem is stated and applies to both pure exchange
economies and production economies (with or without bonds). As we show
in Section 4 below, the requirement to prove Theorem 1 is that there is at
least one asset (J ≥ 1); this can be either a bond or a stock.
To establish our main result we assume that the initial state coincides with
a no-tax equilibrium (E − t I with t I = 0). Further, we restrict attention
to those economies, parameterized by initial endowments, for which no-
tax equilibria exist and are regular (see Theorem 2, and Corollary 2, in
Section 4). For fixed (u, f, R), the set of regular economies is denoted
by ∗. Regularity of equilibria is necessary to carry out local analysis (or
comparative statics), since it ensures (local) differentiability of consumer
demand for commodities and assets, and (local) differentiability of the net-
supply schedules. Moreover, we use the notation ∗ = ∗ × U × Y the
set of regular economies parameterized by endowments, preferences and
technologies. For every ω ∈ ∗ a regular no-tax E − t I equilibrium exists;
that is, for t I in an open neighborhood of zero, an E − t I equilibrium with
t I = 0 exists (again, see Theorem 2 and Corollary 2).
Referring to Section 4 for a complete proof of Theorem 1, here, we
provide a sketch of its main arguments. Let ξ = (ξ ′, t I ) ∈ Rn0 × T I be
a vector of endogenous variables and policy instruments appearing in the
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extended system of equilibrium first-order conditions, and let F(ξ ;ω) = 0
denote such a system (see Section 4 for the precise definitions). The num-
ber of equations in the system is n, equal to the sum of the number n′ of
endogenous variables and the number S of policy instruments. The no-tax
equilibrium set is
E = {(ξ, ω) : F (ξ ;ω) = 0, t I = 0} ,
and, when restricted to ∗, it is a manifold. Next, define the function V :
E → RH such that V (ξ ;ω) = (u1(x1), . . . , uH (xH )) is the vector of
utility functions. Further, let
G(ξ ;ω) =
[
F (ξ ;ω)
V (ξ ;ω)
]
.
To prove Theorem 1 it suffices to show that there exists a marginal tax change
dtI , in an open neighborhood of t I = 0, such that the new equilibrium
(ξ + dξ) is Pareto superior, that is, DξV =
(
du1, . . . , duH
)  0. This can
be done by proving that G behaves locally as a submersion, i.e.,
DG
(
ξ ′, t I ;ω) =
(
DF
(
ξ ′, t I ;ω)
DV
(
ξ ′, t I ;ω)
)
(ξ ′,tI ;ω)∈E
has full row rank. In fact, observe that, when the subspace spanned by the
rows of DG is equivalent to Rn+H , it includes vectors whose first n entries
are zero and the remaining H positive:
Dξ ′Fdξ
′ + DtI ′FdtI ′ = 0,
Dξ ′V dξ
′ + DtI ′V dtI ′ > 0
for some tax reform, dtI , and corresponding changes in the endogenous
equilibrium variables dξ ′.7
An equivalent, but instructive, way to describe our proof is as follows.
Assume that G is a submersion at a no-tax equilibrium, for an economy ω.
Then, rDG
(
ξ ′, t I , ω
) = 0 if and only if r = 0, i.e., the following system
has no solution,
(
rDG
(
ξ ′, t I ;ω)
‖r‖ − 1
)
= 0. (1)
This has a natural interpretation in terms of standard welfare analysis. As-
sume that a planner chooses
(
ξ ′, t I
)
such that first-order (necessary) con-
ditions for the optimality of the equilibrium allocation hold: the welfare
function we have in mind is W = ∑h ahuh
(
xh
) + µF (ξ ′, t I ;ω), with
7 Constrained suboptimality is equivalent to the existence of a feasible direction of tax
reforms in the sense of Guesnerie (1977).
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multipliers (a, µ). Then, the above technique is used to show that t I = 0
would typically not satisfy the first-order (necessary) conditions for a local
maximum of W with Lagrange multipliers r = (µ, a), except for the trivial
case r = 0.8
In showing that (1) has no solution, we have to check that the number of
policy objectives (the utility levels) do not exceed the number of instruments
(tax/transfers).9 Then we prove that the (local) property of G is generic: we
show that our result holds for a set of economies, ∗∗, that is (nonempty)
open and dense in ∗.10
Observe that the submersion property of G is a sufficient condition for
proving the statement of Theorem 1. If DG is locally onto, then the subspace
spanned by the rows of DG is equivalent to Rn+H , therefore including
vectors whose first n entries are zero with the remaining H either positive or
negative. This implies that there also exist directions dtI ′ which are socially
undesirable,
Dξ ′Fdξ
′ + DtI ′FdtI ′ = 0,
Dξ ′V dξ
′ + DtI ′V dtI ′ ≤ 0.
This directly implies the following.
Corollary 1. In the context of Theorem 1, for almost every regular economy
ω in ∗∗, there exist tax reforms which can achieve any direction of utility
changes in an open neighborhood of the no-tax equilibrium allocations.
This generalization of Theorem 1 should be read as a warning to policy
makers. The effects of our income tax reforms on private risk-sharing op-
portunities may be socially undesirable. This should even increase the level
of concern if interpreted in the context of our simple economy. In contrast
8 Here, one has to be a little careful. The latter planner’s problem is compact but fails to
be convex. The non-convexity of the set of centralized attainable allocations implies that
the constrained Pareto frontier need not be convex either. Then, the set of maxima obtained
from the Lagrangian fails to provide a complete representation of the constrained Pareto
frontier (e.g., any concave segment of the frontier is not attainable from the Lagrangian
maximization). Yet, the proof of our main result shows that the first-order conditions of the
above problem, evaluated at the no-tax equilibrium, do typically fail to hold. Therefore,
competitive equilibria are, typically, not extrema (neither maxima nor minima nor saddle
points) of that problem, and r = 0.
9 Observe that the number of equations in the new system rDG = 0 is equal to the number
of columns of DG, and thus to the number of original unknowns (z′, t). The unknowns of
rDG = 0 are the components of r whose number is equal to the number of equations in
G = 0.
10 These steps follow the submersion approach, originally due to Smale (1974). Geanako-
plos and Polemarchakis (1986) first suggested its application to prove constrained subopti-
mality of equilibria when asset markets are incomplete.
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with most of the GEI literature, our results are not driven by changes in rela-
tive spot prices (as, for example, in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986),
Geanakoplos et al. (1990), Cass and Citanna (1998), Citanna et al. (1998)).
Yet, relative price changes would certainly increase the level of complex-
ity of any policy analysis, by introducing an additional policy transmission
channel. Another potential source of complexity is the policy scheme. Here,
we have used a very simplified definition of constrained suboptimality, with
very strong restrictions on the type of policy interventions allowed to the
planner: interventions are anonymous; publicly announced when all mar-
kets are still open (i.e., they are also ex-post constrained efficient); fiscal
budget is required to balance in every date and state of the world (see Defi-
nition 1). All these assumptions, if changed, would increase the complexity
of equilibrium computations, and policy evaluations.
Remark 1 (Extending Theorem 1 to E − t I with t I = 0). Our main result
holds when the initial state is a regular equilibrium with a non-trivial tax
system, t I . Although we do not provide a complete argument in support of
our claim, the reader can check that this is true by adapting the proof of
Theorem 1 below.
3.2. Concluding comments
Our results contribute to highlighting the welfare properties of personal
income taxation in incomplete market economies. As pointed out in the
introduction, we focus on a particular aspect of state-contingent taxation,
namely, its ability to affect private risk-sharing opportunities through direct
asset span effects. A local marginal change of the tax system acts directly on
the asset span, changing (but not augmenting) consumers’ ability to redis-
tribute income across contingencies. Thus, even if the tax reforms consid-
ered do not reduce the degree of market incompleteness, they may modify
individual risk-sharing opportunities, allowing consumers to reallocate re-
sources in a direction that was initially financially unfeasible. When this
happens, we may say that the tax reform has social insurance effects.
Before going further, recall that the use of tax reforms entails a different
constrained optimality criterion with respect to the one traditionally used in
the GEI literature which we refer to as Diamond constrained efficiency (or
simply CPO; see Diamond (1967), Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986),
and Geanakoplos et al. (1990)). Thus, to ease the interpretation of our re-
sults, a comparison of the welfare properties of equilibria under the two
constrained optimality criteria may help the reader. Moreover, since the defi-
nitions of the set of CPO allocations, and the welfare properties of equilibria,
are different in a pure exchange economy in comparison with a production
economy, we shall keep the two cases distinct. Again, this is possible since,
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as we show in Section 4 below, Theorem 1 holds for a class of economies
that encompasses these two.
Pure exchange GEI. In a pure exchange economy, a CPO is an allocation
that cannot be Pareto improved by a portfolio redistribution, when date zero
lump-sum transfers are also a viable policy instrument. It is well-known
that, in this setting, every competitive GEI entails a CPO allocation. Instead,
Theorem 1 shows that there exists a generic set of economies in which every
pure exchange equilibrium is not an IT-CPO. In other words, our notion of
constrained efficiency (Definition 4) is stronger than the one proposed by
Diamond.
Example 1. Consider an economy with one firm, two consumers, and two
states of uncertainty (J = J1 = 1, H = S = 2). Consumers have different,
quasi-linear, utilities, and identical endowments:
u1
(
x1
) = x10 + 5
√
x11 + x12 ,
u2
(
x2
) = x20 + x21 + 5
√
x22 ,
e1 = e2 = (3, .5, .5) .
The only asset is a riskless bond R = (1, 1). This economy has a unique
equilibrium that coincides with the no-trade equilibrium. Figure 1(a) repre-
sents the equilibrium, in the space of second-period consumption, with the
thick lines being the present value budget constraints (evaluated at the equi-
librium individual state prices), and the dotted line representing the income
transfers line (i.e., the asset span).
– An optimal tax reform. The equilibrium can be locally Pareto improved via
a marginal income tax reform: dt1 = (−1,−5)%; we are taxing the return
from the asset in state 2 more heavily than in state 1. Consumer 1, who has a
particularly strong taste for consumption in state 1, buys the bond issued by
consumer 2, who instead has relatively stronger taste for the good in state 2.
The sacrifice of 2, in terms of second-period consumption, is compensated
by an increase in her consumption at date zero, due to her gains in asset
trade. The summary of results is expressed in percentage change from the
bench mark no-tax CPO equilibrium:
%x0 %x1 %x2 %θ %u
h = 1 −6.71 1.5 1.45 1.52 .04
h = 2 6.71 −1.5 −1.45 −1.52 .04
Figure 1(a) represents the equilibrium in the space of second-period in-
come (i.e., for given equilibrium levels of first-period consumption). The
tax reform tilts the asset span–line clockwise (see Fig. 1(b)); at the new
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equilibrium state prices, the present value budget constraints of 1 and 2,
respectively, become flatter and steeper, to support the new allocations.
Production GEI. In a production economy, a CPO is a consumption and
production allocation that cannot be Pareto improved by any alternative
resource-feasible allocation, which is achievable through (i) portfolio redis-
tributions, (ii) (technologically feasible) changes of production decisions,
(iii) date zero, lump-sum transfers. In other words, centralized income allo-
cations are still implemented via portfolio transfers; yet, in comparison with
a pure exchange, the planner can affect the asset-payoff structure through
(technologically feasible) production decisions.
Ray technologies. In the context of a one-commodity GEI, Diamond showed
that equilibria are CPO, provided that multi-linear (or ray) production tech-
nologies are assumed (see Diamond (1967)). If more general forms of tech-
nology are introduced, equilibria need not be CPO. This was first demon-
strated by an example of Dre`ze (see Dre`ze (1987), Chapter 4, p. 278) and,
more recently, subjected to further investigation in Dierker et al. (1999).Yet,
two things should be noted. First, even with ray technologies a CPO equilib-
rium need not be an IT-CPO. State-contingent tax reforms may modify pro-
duction plans in a way that is not technologically feasible, by independently
controlling production output, state-by-state (although not firm-by-firm).An
illustration of our claim can be immediately derived from Example 1, by
assuming that the only asset is a production plan, ys = µsy0, µs ∈ R+, for
all s > 0. Then, tax reforms allow the planner to control ys , independently
across states, a much more powerful intervention than just setting y0.
General production technologies. One can show that CPO equilibria may
fail to be IT-CPO for more general forms of technologies. Let us consider
the examples in Dre`ze (1987) and Dierker et al. (1999). First, recall that
the type of argument provided in these examples is not based on marginal
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reforms; instead, discrete changes in portfolios and/or production alloca-
tions are required to show constrained inefficiency. Both examples do, in
fact, exploit the nonconvexity of the set of centralized attainable allocations
and show that equilibrium allocations may fail to be globally efficient. For
instance, in Dierker et al. (1999) the only interior11, Dre`ze, equilibrium is at
the minimum aggregate welfare point; yet this is a local CPO equilibrium:
a marginal production change, and a portfolio readjustment, may locally
Pareto improve the allocation, but cannot be supported as a competitive
equilibrium. To put it differently, although the tax reform may be Pareto
improving, it may not survive a successive round of competitive trade. The
only two other equilibria are corners, in which the only firm in the economy
is, respectively, owned by the first and by the second consumer. This exam-
ple is a robust case in which an interior Dre`ze equilibrium is a local (but
not global) CPO equilibrium. In Example 2 below, first, we show that the
interior equilibrium, despite being a local CPO, is not an IT-CPO; second,
we show that even the two corner equilibria, which are global CPO, fail to be
IT-CPO. To put it differently, tax reforms (as in Definition 1) may have first-
order effects that are strong enough to achieve a local Pareto improvement,
while the same cannot be said of policy reforms in the sense of Diamond.
Example 2. Consider an economy with utilities as in Example 1 above, in
which consumers are partners of the only firm,
Y = {y ∈ R3 : y0 = −1, y1 + y2 ≤ −y0
}
.
This economy has three (no-tax) Dre´ze equilibria: a symmetric equilibrium
with each consumer holding 1/2 of the firm producing y = (−1, 0.5, 0.5),
and two corner equilibria in which consumer 1 (respectively, consumer 2)
is the single owner of the firm and y = (−1, 1, 0) (resp., y = (−1, 0, 1))
is produced. Figure 2(a) below represents equilibria in the space of second-
period consumption (where, for clarity, we omit present value budget con-
straints).12 Equilibria can be perfectly Pareto ranked: assuming identical
welfare weights, and allowing for date zero lump-sum transfers, the sym-
metric equilibrium is Pareto dominated by either of the two alternative corner
equilibria; the latter two, instead, have the same welfare properties. More-
over, since all equilibria are technologically efficient, this ranking can be
thought to depend only on their risk sharing properties. Corner equilibria
are global CPO (the symmetric equilibrium is a local, but not a global, CPO
11 Here we use the term “interior” referring both to portfolios and allocation: an interior
equilibrium is one in which two (or more) consumers are partners in each firm, and such that
individual consumption is strictly positive.
12 At the first corner equilibrium (θ1 = y1 = 1.0), β2 = λ12 ≤ β1 = λ11 guarantees that
the production plan is a profit maximizer at β. The second corner equilibrium is symmetric
to the first.
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equilibrium). In Fig. 2(b) below, we plot the aggregate (indirect) utility level
as a function of the return from holding the firm in state 1 (i.e., θ1y1), and
fixed x0, when allocations are feasible in the sense of Diamond. It is im-
mediate that the minimum welfare is obtained at the symmetric allocation,
while the only two CPO are corner solutions. Thus, Fig. 2(b) shows that
at a minimum welfare point, the symmetric equilibrium is a local CPO-
equilibrium: a Pareto superior equilibrium can be achieved by a Diamond
central planner via discrete portfolios and production reallocations.
– Optimal tax reforms 1. (Interior equilibrium) We start from the interior
equilibrium, and assume that a tax reform, such as the one considered in
Example 1, is introduced: dt1 = (−1,−5)%. Then a Pareto improvement
is obtained with a .04% increase in the utility of both agents, and an 4.17%
increase in the share of agent 1 in the firm:
%x0 %x1 %x2 %θ %u
h = 1 −7.86 1.06 1.98 4.17 .04
h = 2 7.86 −1.06 −1.98 −4.17 .04
2. (Corner equilibria) Since the two corner equilibria are symmetric, we
consider only the one in which consumer 1 is the single owner of the firm.
The tax reform dt1 = (.1, 0)% is weakly Pareto improving:
%x0 %x1 %x2 %θ %u
h = 1 −.05 0.5 0 0 .06
h = 2 0.5 −0.5 0 0 0
In words, a (global) CPO equilibrium can be improved upon by using pro-
portional income taxes.
0
1
2
3
s=2
1 2 3
s=1
15
15.2
15.4
15.6
15.8
16
U
0 0.5 1
(a) (b)
Fig. 2.
Income taxation when markets are incomplete 115
Theorem 1 establishes a set of sufficient conditions for marginal, per-
sonal income tax reforms to provide social insurance. In particular, the
following requirements must be met: markets are sufficiently incomplete,
and consumers sufficiently heterogeneous, 2 ≤ H ≤ S − J ; there are
enough policy instruments; the initial economy is chosen in a generic set in
which interiority conditions hold (see Theorem 2 in Section 4). The special
case of a representative consumer, who is also the single owner of the only
firm in the economy (H = J = 1), is analyzed in Diamond and Mirrlees
(1992). Diamond and Mirrlees show that there exist economies where ad
valorem contingent taxes on dividends can be used to implement a first best
equilibrium.13 Yet, even in this simple case the type of economy for which
optimality is achieved is that peculiar type in which consumers do not want
to redistribute income across states. In other words, economies in which the
initial endowment distribution, or the type of consumer preference, is such
that the restrictions arising from market incompleteness to consumers are
non-binding.14
For a better understanding of our results, we go back to our economy.
Local perturbations of the tax system act directly on the asset span, tilting
the subspace of feasible income transfers away from its original position. In
doing so, the consumer may transfer income in a direction that is orthogonal
to the initial asset span.Yet, unlike in the case of fixed payoff structures,15 or
in that of simple linear technologies (e.g., Example 2), the final asset span
crucially depends on firms’ behavior. It is far from obvious that production
decisions do not offset the effects of tax reform, thereby neutralizing the
planner’s policy.16 To complete our analysis of Theorem 1 we need to bring
into the picture production decisions and firms’ state prices, β. Our explana-
tion of Theorem 1 is based on the idea that firms, unlike the central planner,
take the asset span as given. First, observe that, at t1 = 0, firm j ’s pricing
criterion reduces to βj,0 = ∑h θhj λh; hence, the initial no-tax equilibrium
allocation is still optimal for firm j if the tax reform does not have a direct
13 I thank Herakles Polemarchakis for pointing out this reference to me.
14 A further peculiar situation is represented by the case of generically (or effectively)
complete markets. When the number of consumer types satisfies 1 ≤ H ≤ J , it is always
possible to find asset structures that would allow consumers to effectively achieve a full
efficient diversification of market risk.
15 See also the literature on real indeterminacy (e.g., Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell (1989),
Balasko and Cass (1989)).
16 Remember that after each policy reform re-allocations of commodity and assets are
completely decentralised (i.e., achieved competitively by private agents through trade on the
existent commodity and asset markets).
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asset span effect: the matrix



dt11
. . .
dt1S


M(y1, 0).
induces the same column span of M(y1, 0).17 Theorem 1 shows that, if
this is not the case, 〈M(y1, 0)〉 =
〈
M(y1, dt
1)
〉
, then the initial production
decisions are no longer individually optimal at βj,0 (βj,0 (dt1yj ) = 0) for
some dt1 and some j .18 Moreover, there is room for a change of the (after
tax) payoff vectors in a direction that was otherwise unfeasible for the private
sector at the initial, no-tax, equilibrium (dt1yj ∈ 〈M(y1, 0)〉⊥).19 Yet, for
production changes not to kill the direct span effect of a tax reform, we need
to account for indirect (or equilibrium) state-price effects (i.e., pecuniary
externalities), that is, changes in βj which may support the new allocation
as an individual optimum for j .20 Our proof provides direct calculations
confirming this intuition. It also shows that the assumption that the planner
computes the equilibrium, accounting for the state-price externalities, is not
essential: the argument in the proof also goes through if the central planner
does not anticipate the effects of a change in individual state prices (λ)
on firms’ state prices (β). Thus, no particular informational advantage is
required for the planner to implement a tax reform. For our theorem to
hold, the planner is “only” required to have statistical information on the
consumer types, firm technologies, state prices, and market structure. That
is, based on a complete, but abstract, representation of the economy, a Pareto
improving tax reform can be designed by computing and comparing different
equilibria. Once a tax reform has been chosen, and the corresponding tax
vector publicly announced, the final allocation is determined competitively,
with each agent truthfully revealing her/his type.
17 In fact, a tax reform characterized by uniform tax changes across states satisfies
βj,0(dt1yj + dyj ) = 0, and thus βj,0(dt1yj ) = 0, for every individually optimal
initial production allocation yj (i.e., dyj such that ∇f j (yj ) · dyj ≤ 0), that is, the ini-
tial no-tax production plans are individually optimal. Here, and elsewhere,  denotes the
elementwise vector product: for x, y ∈ RC , xy = (x1y1, . . . , xCyC)′.
18 A tax reform that produces a direct span effect implies that dt1yj /∈ 〈M(0, y1)〉. Then,
βj,0(dt1yj + dyj ) = 0 for every individually optimal initial production allocation yj
(i.e., dyj such that Df j (yj ) · dyj = 0). This implies that yj need not be ex-post optimal
for j at βj,0.
19 Here, by “feasibility” we are directly referring to financial feasibility. On technological
feasibility, observe that after tax-payoffs of a firm j , (1 + dt1)yj , may not be in Y j .
20 At the tax equilibrium, arising after a tax reform, the production plan yj ′ = yj + dyj is
optimal for j at βj = βj,0 + dβj,0 if Df j (yj ′) is collinear to βj , that is, if the production
choice tilts the gradient of the transformation function away from the original position.
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It should be clear, by now, that our focus on “capital income taxes” is
made without loss of generality. Our analysis and all our results extend
substantially unchanged to either of the following alternative tax policies:
(a) a proportional, state-contingent, anonymous, tax/subsidy system on in-
dividual total income (returns from portfolio holdings plus endowment
income);
(b) a proportional, state-contingent, asset (or sector) specific, tax/subsidy
system on individual capital income.
In (a), if the two components of individual income can be taxed inde-
pendently, no further instrument is required to achieve state-by-state fiscal
budget balance. On the contrary, if income is subject to a state-contingent
uniform tax a second policy variable is needed in each state to achieve
within states-budget balance; a variable that does not introduce any further
distortion is a state-contingent, anonymous, lump-sum transfer as the one
considered in Definition 1. This last observation applies to (b), where up to
J policy variables can be used in each state. Yet, now such an increase in
the number of tax variables implies the loss of anonymity (taxes/subsidies
become firm-type specific).21 If bonds are taxed, (b) accounts for the case in
which interest payments are tax deductible, as well as for the case in which
they are not.
Remark 2 (Asset span versus relative spot price effects). A marginal tax
reform, dtI ∈ RS , induces a first-order welfare effect on (the indirect utility
of) h that, in a multi-commodity GEI, is equivalent to:
(i) the second-order effect (pecuniary externality) produced via a change
of relative spot prices by a planner acting under the CPO criterion as in
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) and Geanakoplos et al. (1990);
(ii) the second-order effect (pecuniary externality) produced by the taxation
of trades in assets in Citanna et al. (2001).
Indeed, in an exchange GEI, a marginal change in tax instruments has the
following key effect on the utility of h (see Equation 8 in Section 4):
duh = λhZhDtIMdtI
= (λh1zh1, . . . , λhSzhS
)



dtI1
. . .
dtIS


MdtI .
In an exchange GEI with multiple commodities, a similar effect is obtained
through changes in relative spot prices: when dq = 0, duh = λhZhDζpdζ ,
21 A fiscal policy like (b) has been analyzed in Tirelli (1999).
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for a policy reform dζ (e.g., see Equation (71) in Magill and Shafer (1991),
and Section 3 in Citanna et al. (2001)).
If H ≤ S − J , our main result shows that there exists a generic set of
economies in which equilibria possess sufficient utility variation (see (iv)
in Theorem 2 below). This upper bound condition is only sufficient, as we
have shown in Examples 1, 2 above.
4. Proofs
First-order (sufficient) conditions (Foc’s) for the existence of an interior
E − t I (with (xh, θhj , yj )  0 for all j ∈ J2, θhj = 0 for all j ∈ J1 and all
h) can be written as:
(1) ∀h, Duh(xh) − λh = 0 NH
(2) ∀h, −xh + e˜h + W(q, y, t1)θh = 0 NH
(3) ∀h, λhW(q, y, t1) = 0 JH
(4) ∀j, βj − υjDf j (yj ) = 0, βj =
∑
h
θ
h
j λ
h(1 + t1) NJ2
(5) ∀j, f j (yj ) = 0 J2
(6) ∀j ∈ J1,
∑
h
θhj = 0 J1
∀j ∈ J2,
∑
h
θhj − 1 = 0 J2
(7) ∀s,
∑
h∈H
(
t0s + t1s
(∑
j∈J1
θhj R
j
s +
∑
j∈J2
θhj y
j
s
))
= 0, S
(2)
where λ, υ are Lagrange multipliers.22 Each subsystem of equations is in-
dexed byArabic numbers on the left-hand side, and its dimension is indicated
on the right-hand side.
Let F˜ : ′ × T I ×  → Rn′ , where F˜ (ξ ′, t I , ψ) = 0 represents the
left-hand side of the system of equilibrium first-order conditions, excluding
the government budget constraint, where ′ ⊂ Rn′ has typical element
ξ ′ = (x, θ, λ, y, υ, q, t0), with n′ = 2HN + HJ + JN + 2J + S, and
 ⊂ Rk+ denotes the parameter space, with typical element ψ =
(
e, η, θ
)
,
and k = N (H + J )+HJ . Here, without loss of generality, we let the policy
22 In particular, the first two multipliers are attached to the constraints of the consumer
problem (ρ refers to the no-short sale constraints). Here υ is the vector of multipliers related
to the firms’ optimization problem.
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instrument vector be t I = t1. Adding the government budget constraints to
F˜ , we obtain a new system of equations which we denote by F : × →
R
n
, with n = n′ + S and  = ′ × T I ⊂ Rn′+S . Thus F = 0 represents the
complete system of first-order conditions of the E − t I .
We endow the space of functions Y × U with the C2 compact-open
(weak) topology. For simplicity, let Y × U denote the topological space
Y × U, C2 (Y)× C2 (U). We also assume that the space of endowments has
the usual (Euclidean) topology.
We are now ready to establish local existence of an interior equilibrium.
Theorem 2 (Local existence and regularity of an E − t I , t I = 0). Consider
an economy E (ω) with fixed (uh, f j )h,j . Further, let Assumptions 1, 2 hold
and H ≤ S − J . If t I = 0, there exists a set of economies ∗ ⊂ , open
and of full measure, such that, for every ψ ∈ ∗, there exists a (locally
isolated) E − t I equilibrium with the following properties:
(i) the equilibrium is regular;
(ii) W has full rank;
(iii) θhj = 0 for all h, j ;
(iv) the following matrix has full rank H :
Z =



λ11
(
z11 − y1/H
) · · · λ1S
(
z1S − yS/H
)
...
...
λH1
(
zH1 − y1/H
) · · · λHS
(
zHS − yS/H
)


 , (3)
where z = x − e, ys =
∑
j∈J2 y
j
s .
Proof. Generic existence and regularity of E − t I at t I = 0 substantially
follow from Theorem 2 in Geanakoplos et al. (1990). Generic properties (i)
through (iii) are standard23,24 while (iv) coincides with the property in item
3 of Lemma 1 of Citanna et al. (2001) in a pure exchange GEI (J1 = 0). To
23 Geanakoplos et al. (1986, 1989, 1990) point out that there are two sources of non-
differentiability of security demand functions (θh
j
) which follow from the no-short sales
assumption. The first occurs whenever θh
j
= 0, ρh
j
= 0 (i.e., the constraint is binding, but
this has “no cost” for the consumer). Yet, one can show that such a case in not generic in the
endowments. The most problematic source of non-differentiability occurs when θh
j
= 0 for
some (h, j) and rank(W) < J . However, assuming that (H + J ) ≤ N , they show that: (i)
there exists a generic set of economies for which equilibria are of full rank; (ii) in restricting
attention to such economies, typically equilibria are such that the no-short sale constraints
do not bind. The latter implies that θh
j
≥ 0 for all h and all j ∈ J2.
24 To show regularity we can endow the parameter space, , with the usual topology: let
O ⊂ RN(H+J ) ×RHJ+ represent the class of (non-empty and) open subsets ofRN(H+J ) ×
R
HJ+ ; a subset ˆ ⊂  is open if and only if ˆ = O ∩  for some O ∈ O.
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show that this property holds we can proceed by appending
(b1, . . . , bH )Z = 0,
bbT − 1 = 0
to the equilibrium system, F = 0, and show that the new system as no
solution at t I = 0 (for this we need that H ≤ S − J ). This property is
implied by the well-known property of local controllability of individual
state prices, λ. Thus, restrict attention to the set ∗ for which Theorem 2
in Geanakoplos et al. (1990) holds, and (i) through (iv) are satisfied; these
properties can be shown to hold generically in consumers’ endowments, e.
Observe that, at t I = 0, F˜ and the system of first-order GEI equilibrium
conditions, F , are identical, and that so are their Jacobians with respect to
ξ ′. Therefore,
rank
(
Dξ ′F˜ (ξ
′, t I , ψ) |F˜ (ξ ′,tI ,ψ)=0
)
tI=0 = n′,
and the set of regular equilibria, F˜ −1(0), is a manifold of dimension k =
dim(). Next, we add the government budget constraint to F˜ to get F ,
the complete system of first-order conditions of the E − t I equilibrium.
We want to show that the Jacobian of F , evaluated at a no-tax equilibrium,
has full rank. Now
(
Dξ ′,tI F |F˜ (ξ ′,tI ,ψ)=0
)
tI=0 has the following structure (its
complete representation is in (5) below, with the last column and row blocks
deleted):
var. ξ ′ t1
equ. − − −− − − − − −
F˜ | Dξ ′ F˜
n′×n′
..........
∑
h∈H
(
t0s + t1s
(∑
j∈J1 θ
h
j
Rj +∑j∈J2 θhj y
j
1
))
= 0 | 0
[∑
j∈J2 y
j
s
]
S×S
(∗)
(∗) : [ξs ]denotes a block-diagonal matrix with typical element ξs .
Since we take ψ ∈ ∗, we have that ∑j yjs = 0 for all s. Thus, if 0 is a
regular value of F˜ , it is also a regular value of F . unionsq
By straightforward application of the implicit function theorem, we ob-
tain the following.
Corollary 2. In the context of Theorem 2, for every ψ ∈ ∗, there exists an
open neighborhood N (0) of t I = 0 such that, for all t I ∈ N (0),
rank
(
Dξ ′,tI F (ξ
′, t I , ψ) |F(ξ ′,tI ,ψ)=0
) = n,
and F(ξ ′, t I , ψ) is transverse to zero.
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Next, restricting attention to economies in ∗, we turn to proving Theo-
rem 1. We do so by showing that G = (F, u1, . . . , uH ) (ξ ′, t I , ω) behaves
as a submersion, when it is evaluated at a no-tax equilibrium of ψ ∈ ∗.
As we have already argued, this is equivalent to showing that the following
system (locally) has no solution:
0 =
[
rDξG
‖r‖ − 1
]
(ξ ′,tI ,ω)∈E
. (4)
To this end, it is sufficient to show that there exists a local parameterization
of the economy such that (4) has the desired (local) properties. For reasons
that will soon become clear, the type of parameterization that does the job
is one that allows us to perturb the Hessian of u and f without altering
the values of the functions and their gradients. The latter is convenient,
since it implies that perturbations do not modify the equilibrium first-order
conditions. One such class of functions is the one that admits quadratic
perturbations. Denoting by clN the closure of the set N , let
uh
(
xh;Ah) = uh (xh)+ 1
2
(xh − xˆh)T Ahγ h (xh) (xh − xˆh) if xh ∈ N (xˆh)
= uh (xh) if xh /∈ clN(xˆh),
fj
(
yj ;Bj ) = f j (yj )+ 1
2
(yj − yˆj )T Bjδj (yj ) (yj − yˆj ) if yj ∈ N (yˆj )
= f j (yj ) if yj /∈ clN(yˆj ).
Here Ah is a square symmetric N -dimensional matrix of parameters, which
are taken to be sufficiently small to preserve strict quasi-concavity of the
utility function. Define byN , andN , neighborhoods of xˆh, possibly empty,
such that clN ⊂ N ⊂ clN ⊂ RS++,  > 0. Further, γ h are smooth bump
functions (see Hirsch (1976), p. 41), taking value 1 if xh ∈ N , and 0 if
xh /∈ clN . The same construction has been used for fj .
Without loss of generality, the Jacobian of G with respect to (ξ ′, t1),
evaluated at t I = t1 = 0, is represented in the following table with the first
column referring to the equation numbering in (2) above, and the first row
reporting the variables with respect to which derivatives are computed.25
25 Observe that delating the last row block from the above Jacobian provides the represen-
tation of the Jacobian of the equilibrium first-order conditions of an E− tI (i.e., the Jacobian
of F ), evaluated at tI = t1 = 0.
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...xh... ...θh... ...λh... ...υj ... ...yj ... ...qj ... t1 t0
− − − − − −− − − −− − − − − − −− − − −− − − − − − −−
1 [D2uh] 0 −[IN ] 0 0 0 0 0
2 −INH [W ] 0 0
..........
...θh
j
IN ...
..........
..........
θ
hT− θhT
0S×J
..........
......
0, . . . , 0
[∑
j θ
h
j
y
j
s
]
.......
.....
0
IS
.....
3 0 0 [WT ] 0
........[
λh
]
..........
........
λh0IJ
..........
........
..., 0, ...
..., λhs ys, ...
..........
0
4 0 0
............
...θ
h
j IN ...
...........
[Df jT] −[D2f j ] 0
......
0, ..., 0
∑
h θ
h
j [λhs ]
.......
0
5 0 0 0 0 [Df j ] 0 0 0
6 0 ...IJ ... 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0
[∑
j∈J2y
j
s
]
HIS
8 [Duh] 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(5)
[cs ] denotes a diagonal matrix with typical diagonal element cs varying across s.
Looking at Equation (2), it is immediate that, if DG has full row rank,
rDG = 0 has equations outnumbering the unknowns r = (r1, . . . , r8) ∈
R
n+H
. Thus, it is sufficient to show that the Jacobian (5) has independent
rows. An explicit formulation of (4) is:
(I) ∀h, r1
h
D2uh − r2
h
+ r8
h
Duh = 0 NH r1
(II) ∀h, j, r2
h
Wj + r6
j
= 0 JH r3
(III) ∀h, −r1
h
+ r3
h
WT +∑j θhj r4j = 0 NH r2
(IV) ∀j ∈ J2, r4j Df j
T = 0 J2 r5
(V) ∀s,∀j ∈ J2,−
∑
h
(
θh
j
r2
h,s
− r3
h,j
λhs
)
NJ2 r4
− r4
j
D2.sf
j − r5
j
Dsf
j = 0
(VI) ∀j, ∑h r2h,0
(
θh
j
− θhj
)
−∑h λh0r3hj = 0 J r6
(VII) ∀s ∈ S, ∑j,h
(
θh
j
r2
h,s
W
j
s + r3h,j λhs Wjs
)
S (r8)
+∑j∈J2
(
r7s W
j
s + r4j,sβjs
)
= 0
(VIII) ∀s ∈ S, ∑h r2h,s + Hr7s = 0 S r7
(IX) ‖r‖ − 1 = 0 1
(6)
where each block of equations is labelled in Roman numbers on the left-hand
side, and the last two columns on the right-hand side indicate the number of
equations in each block, with the unknown variables (r) to which they can
be matched.
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Proof of Theorem 1. Let ∗ be a subset of  restricted to ∗, and ∗∗ be a
subset of ∗ such that, for every ω ∈ ∗∗, G(ω) is a submersion. Applying
Lemma 1 and 2 below we conclude that ∗∗ is open and dense in . unionsq
Lemma 1. ∗∗ ⊂ ∗ is open.
Proof. Recall that ξ = (ξ ′, t1), and let DξV α denote a generic submatrix
of the Jacobian of V with respect to ξ . Define
Kα =
{
u ∈ RH : det (DξV α
) = 0} = det (DξV α
)−1
(0).
This set is closed in RH .26 The set of critical points of the map V , N ={
u ∈ RH : det (DξV α
) = 0 ∀α} = ∩αKα, is also closed. Therefore its
complement NR = RH/N is open.
Let the function ϕ : E →  be the natural projection of the equilibrium
manifold onto the parameter space. Define
Bc =
{
(ξ, u, f, ψ) ∈ E :
[
det
(
DξF
)
det
(
DξV
α
)
]
= 0 ∀α
}
,
the set of critical values of ϕ. Bc is relatively closed, being the preimage of
{0} under a continuous function. Then, to ensure that the image of Bc under
the mapping ϕ is closed, it suffices to establish that ϕ is proper, which is
proved as Lemma 3 in the appendix. Thus, ϕ(Bc) is closed in ∗, and its
complement, ∗∗ = ∗\ϕ(Bc), is relatively open. unionsq
Lemma 2. ∗∗ is dense.
Proof. We divide the proof into two parts: the first considers a pure exchange
economy, J1 = ∅,J2 = ∅, while the second deals with a production econ-
omy, J2 = ∅.
Part 1 (pure exchange GEI) J1 = ∅,J2 = ∅.
In the case of a pure exchange, J2 = ∅, J = J1, (6) reduces to:
(I) ∀h, r1h
(
D2uh + Ah)− r2h + r8hDuh = 0 HN r1
(II) ∀h, r2hW + r6 = 0 HJ r3
(III) ∀h, −r1h + r3hWT = 0 HN r2
(VI) ∀j, ∑h r2h0θhj −
∑
h λ
h
0r
3
hj = 0 J r6
(VII) ∀s ∈ S, ∑h,j
(
θhj r
2
h,s + r3h,jλhs
)
R
j
s = 0 S
(
r8
)
(VIII) ∀s ∈ S, ∑h r2h,s + Hr7s = 0 S r7
(IX) ‖r‖ − 1 = 0 1.
(7)
26 This is because it is the preimage of a singleton by a continuous function, in a complete
metric space. Here, the continuous function is the polynomial associated to the determinant
of the continuous linear mappings DzV α′s.
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Matching the equations in system (7) with the unknowns it is immediate
that if H ≤ S the system has equations outnumbering the unknowns (r).27
Therefore, we are left to show that system (7) has independent equations.
The proof can be divided into the following two cases (a) and (b).
Case (a): r1h = 0 for all h
The following perturbations can be used: ((dr2.,s)Js=1, dr1), respectively,
for Equations (II), (III); dr3h for h = H , for (VI); dr7 for (VIII); dAh for
(I )h (given r1h = 0) for all h. Finally, use ((dr2H,s)s>J , dr3H) for (VII).
Case (b): r1h = 0 for some h
Since, as we are going to show, r1h = 0, for some h, implies that r1h = 0
for all h, we cannot use quadratic perturbations of utilities in the present
case. Yet, our result continues to hold when r1 = 0, and the uh are fixed in
U.
Consider system (7). Now r1h = 0, say for consumer h = H , implies that
r2H − r8HDuH = 0. Then, consumer H ’s foc’s and (II) imply r6 = 0. Since
r6 is independent of h, r2h ∈ 〈W 〉⊥ holds for all h such that r8h = 0. By (III),
r1h = Wr3Th , i.e., either r1h ∈ 〈W 〉 or r3h = 0 (and r1h = 0) for all h = H .
Then, post-multiplying (I)h by r1h , and using the latter result, together with
strict quasi-concavity of uh, we have r1h = 0. This holds for all h.
Also r1 = 0 implies r3 = 0 by (III). Then, consumers’foc’s (λh·Rj = qj )
imply that we can rewrite (VII) as ∑h r8hλhs
∑
j R
j
s θ
h
j =
∑
h r
8
hλ
h
s z
h
s for all
s ∈ S, or, using the notation introduced in Theorem 2, as
(
r81 , . . . , r
8
H
)
Z = 0,
where Z in (3) reduces to
Z =



λ11z
1
1 · · · λ1Sz1S
...
...
λH1 z
H
1 · · · λHS zHS


 . (8)
Since we are considering economies in ∗, under the assumption that
H ≤ S − J , Theorem 2 implies that r8 = (r81 , . . . , r8H
) = 0. This im-
mediately implies r = 0. System (7) has no solution.
Part 2 (production GEI) J2 = ∅.
We prove the result for the case of a pure production economy (with
J1 = ∅, J2 = ∅), since then extending the argument to mixed cases is
27 This has a natural interpretation: the number of policy objectives (the utility levels)
should not exceed the number of tax instruments (contingent taxes/transfers). The latter
condition is an incomplete market analogue of the one due to Tinbergen (1952). Thus, for
example, this bound could be dropped by introducing date 0, lump-sum transfers, τ ∈ RH .
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straightforward. As for Part 1, the proof reduces to showing that system (6)
has independent equations.
Case (a): r1h = 0 for all h
This is analogous to Case (a) in Part 1, except for Equations (IV), (V),
which can, respectively, be perturbed by dr40 , ((dr4.,s)s>0, dr5).
Case (b): r1h = 0 for some h
If we allow r1h = 0 (r4j = 0) for some h (respectively, j ), we cannot use
perturbations of utility (resp., transformation) functions for those h (resp.,
j ). We proceed, first, by showing that r1h = 0, r4j = 0 for (at least) one pair
(h, j), implies that system (6) has no solution (Fact 1). Then, in Fact 2, we
prove that all other cases have the same implication.
Fact 1. If r1h = 0, r4j = 0 for, say, (h, j) = (H, J ), then system (6) has no
solution.
Now r1H = 0, r4J = 0 imply that we can certainly use perturbations of
utility and transformation functions for H and J , respectively. Consider the
“worst” possible case, in which r1h = 0 for all h = H . Since r1h = 0 implies
r2h = r8hDuh, by (I)h, Equation (II)h becomes redundant when the system
is evaluated at equilibrium. Moreover, we can substitute for r2h using (I)h to
drop this equation from (6). Then, the following perturbations can be used in
the new system: ((dr2H,s)Js=1, dr1, dr4.,0), respectively, for Equations (II)H ,
(III), (IV); dr3h for some h = H , for (VI); dr7 for (VIII);
((
dr8h
)
h<H
, dr2H,0
)
for (IX); dAH for (I)H (given r1H = 0). Lastly, use ((dr4j,s)s>0, dr5j ) for (V)j
if j = J , and dBj otherwise; the latter implies that we can use (dr4J,s)s>0
to perturb (VII).
Fact 2. Let r1h = 0 for some h. Then, for r ∈ {r : r1 = 0} ∪ {r : r4 = 0},
system (6) has no solution.
We divide our argument into four steps, (2.0)–(2.3).
(2.0) (r1, r4) = 0 implies r = 0:
Firstly, r1h = 0 implies r2h = r8hDuh by (I), and r6 = 0 by (II) and
consumers’ foc’s; also r3 = 0 by (III). Then, consumers’ foc’s (λh ·Rj = qj )
imply that we can rewrite (VII) as
(
r81 , . . . , r
8
H
)



λ11
(
z11 − y1/H
) · · · λ1S
(
z1S − yS/H
)
...
...
λH1
(
zH1 − y1/H
) · · · λHS
(
zHS − yS/H
)


 = 0, (9)
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where y = ∑j yj . Since we are considering economies in ∗, under the
assumption that H ≤ S−J , Theorem 2 implies that r8 = 0, and thus r = 0.
System (6) has no solution.
(2.1) r1h = 0, for some h, implies that either r4j ∈ 〈W 〉⊥ or r4j = 0 for all j :
Suppose not, so that r4j ∈ 〈W 〉 / {0} for some j , and r1h = 0 for some
h; the latter implies r2h = r8hDuh by (I), and r6 = 0 by (II) and consumers’
foc’s; next, postmultiplying (V)j by r4j , and using strict quasi-convexity of
f j , yields a contradiction, and so r4j = 0.
(2.2) r1 = 0 implies r = 0:
Now r1h = 0 implies that r4j ∈ 〈W 〉⊥ or r4j = 0 for all j , by (2.1).
Also r1h = 0 for all h, and the latter, implies r3h = 0 for all h, by (III)
(and the full rank property of W ). Then, (III) and (I), respectively, imply
∑
j∈J2 θ
h
j r
4
j,s = 0, r2h,s = r8hDsuh for all h, s. Using these results, and con-
sumers’ foc’s (λh · Rj = qj ), in (VII) yields (9) in (2.0) above. Therefore,
r = 0.
(2.3) r1h = 0 for some h and r4 = 0 implies r = 0:
Firstly, r1h = 0, for some h, implies r2h = r8hDuh by (I), and r6 = 0,
r2hW = 0 for all h, by (II). Using r4j = 0, for all j, in (III) implies that
either r1h = r3hWT or
(
r3h, r
1
h
) = 0 for all h. Postmultiplying (I) by r1Th ,
and using the latter result, yields r3hWTD2uhWr3
T
h = 0 for all h. By strict
quasi-concavity of uh, this holds iff r3h = 0 for all h, and hence r1 = 0.
Finally, we can apply (2.0).
We can finally gather the results in Cases (a) and (b), respectively in
Parts 1, 2 above, and conclude the proof by applying Sard’s theorem: there
exists a dense set of economies, ∗∗ in ∗, such that, for every ω in ∗∗,
G(ω) is a submersion (see, e.g., Guillemin and Pollack (1974), p. 62). unionsq
Appendix
Lemma 3. The natural projection ϕ : E →  is proper.
Proof. Let C be a compact and nonempty subset of . We have to show
that, for each converging sequence (ωr)r=1,2,..., (ωr) → ω∗, ωr, ω∗ ∈ C, the
sequence ϕ−1(ωr) = (ξ r , ωr) converges in E (i.e., (ξ r , ωr) → (ξ ∗, ω∗) ∈
E). First, note that every parameter vector (ωr) ∈ C has boundaries. Second,
(by Assumption 2(2)) there are subsequences such that yr is defined on a
compact set when ωr ∈ C; also, by continuity off,f (yr) → |f (y∗)| < ∞,
i.e., (5) of the equilibrium first-order conditions (2) is satisfied. Further,
since f is twice continuously differentiable, Df(yr) → |Df(y∗)| < ∞
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(for any finite B). The asset market clearing condition, together with the
no-short sell conditions, imply that θr → |θ∗| < ∞ is a subsequence
of (θr). Then, Assumption 2(2), and the spot market clearing conditions,
imply that individual demands have subsequences (xr) → |x∗| < ∞ such
that (2) holds. Since the utility function is twice continuously differentiable,
Du (xr) → |Du (x∗)| (for any finite A). This also implies that (λr) →
|λ∗| < ∞, and thus (1) is satisfied. The last condition – together with the
fact that θr is bounded – implies that βr also converges to a finite bounded
entity. Then, note that, by definition of T ′, (t1r ) is always bounded. The
above facts imply that for every firm the Lagrange multiplier υr is such that
υr → |υ∗| < ∞ and (4) holds. Moreover, the above facts, and (3) and (7)
respectively, also imply that there exist subsequences qr → |q∗| < ∞, and
(t0r ) → |t0| < ∞. This completes the proof. unionsq
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